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Berkeley: Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View

ARCHIVAL SECURITY
A PERSONAL AND CIRCUMSTANTI AL VI EW

Edmund Berkeley, Jr.

~

find my involvement in archival security most ironical,
since my chief "background and training" in the subject has
been to be the head of an archival agency which suffered a
major theft. Had I been given a choice, I should have chosen
almost any other method of learning more about this important
and complex subject. Certainly I do not recommend my "training program" in archival security to anyone else! As a
training method, its chief recommendation is that the subject
captures your almost total attention for months and is never
far out of your consciousness thereafter. Living for over
two years with the ramifications of our theft also has made
me intensely aware of the major national problem with archival theft.
Archivists, of course, have been concerned from
ancient times with security, since preservation of the
materials in their charge is their most important duty. In
the not-so-ancient times of the early 1960s when I joined
the profession, as a member of the Archives Division of the
Virginia State Library, I and my colleagues were taught a
good deal about our responsibility to protect and preserve
the materials in our care. Perhaps more emphasis was placed
on protection from theft than on other kinds of preservation
in my on-the-job training, for the Barrow Restoration Shop
was adjacent to the staff workroom. The Shop handled the
other sorts of preservation problems for us. The late
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William J. Van Schreeven, then the state archivist, constantly reminded the junior archivists who had charge of
the reading room that we must always be alert to the possibility of theft. I remember several occasions upon which
he told the staff of a person or persons suspected of having
stolen things from other institutions; very often he had a
description of the suspects, and once, a sketch provided by
an artistically-talented archivist.
Nevertheless, none of these warnings or stories
seemed real to me then. The known thefts had all happened
far away from Virginia, and somehow we seemed safe and secure.
Most of our patrons were ladies and gentlemen, and genealogists over-impressed with the importance of their family
lineage were a much more inunediate problem.
Now it is 1975. Two Virginia institutions--one of
them my own, and the other the institution for which I
formerly worked--have been victims of thefts. The Virginia
State Library has been fortunate in apprehending, prosecuting,
and convicting its thief. Sadly, the University. of Virginia
Library has no solid leads to its thief or thieves after two
years of investigation. These stories are not unique and
can be matched or overshadowed in any gathering of archivists
or curators.
The theft from the University of Virginia Library
is interesting, perhaps, in that it apparently was an "inside job," that is, one in which there were no visible signs
of breaking and entering. · We were not aware that we had been
robbed for a very long time, and this made the work of the
police extremely difficult. Reviewing the circumstances, I
find that the first "incident" of importance was the casual
discovery by a member of the departmental faculty that one
major item was not in its proper filing location when she
went to get it to show to some visitors. She reported the
fact, and we began a routine search for the document.
I use the word "routine" advisedly because we were
in no way alarmed. We do misfile and misplace things occasionally; with more than 9,100,000 items in 12,000 separate
collections, we should be insufferable paragons if we did
not. Thus, when one item was reported missing, it was considered misfiled and a routine happenstance. Because the
item was an historically important one, we did make a number
of searches for it, and I mentioned to the university
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librarian that we could not locate it. Various staff members
conducted searches over a period of some weeks. When they
failed to find the item, I decided I should look myself.
Hunting through the vault filing area where the missing item
should have been, I realized that at least one and possibly
two other items were missing as well.
Mental alarm bells began to ring, because never have
we misfiled more than one item from the same filing area. But
we faced a serious problem in trying to determine whether we
had misfiled the items or another cause accounted for their
absence.
We never have had in our department what librarians
would call a shelf list--a card file or list of the items that
should be found upon inspection of a particular shelf or
filing area. Such lists were not compiled because they could
not materially improve our very good control systems for
locating material. We sincerely regretted not having a shelf
list of the contents of the vault, a rather large area of more
than 900 square feet on two levels. Our department houses a
considerable quantity of material in the vault, which it shares
with the Rare Book Department of the Library. In this special
area are kept our collection of over 3,000 Jefferson papers,
the William Faulkner manuscripts, and many valuable literary
manuscripts from the Barrett Library of American Literature.
In addition it holds materials requiring security but which
have no intrinsic value, such as student records from the
registrar's office and minutes of the Board of Visitors.
Without describing our existing control arrangements
in detail, suffice it to say that we do have a good working
system for locating material in our custody, and that from
the folders comprising this system we were able to prepare
a shelf list of the manuscripts that should have been found
in the vault. Compiling this list occupied the majority of
the members of the faculty and staff for several days and
the clerical staff for nearly a week of typing.
Once this shelf list had been typed onto three-byfive-inch cards, we began a systematic check of the contents
of the vault. Some members of the faculty labored at the
task every day. But we soon discovered that such work cannot be done for more than a few hours at a time, because the
worker becomes sleepy, inattentive, and vocally bored. This
careful search proceeded for several weeks. I kept the
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librarian informed of our activity, but even at this time, I
felt there was no evidence of anything more than our own
carelessness.
Several weeks later, a patron requested a photocopy
of a George Washington letter which he had placed in the
department on deposit.
A staff member went to the vault to
retrieve the letter, could not find it, and immediately
notified me. I in turn at once ordered the entire departmental faculty and some of the library assistants to join the
searching in the vault. By late afternoon we had discovered
the major disappearance of materials from the autograph collection, whence the majority of items were stolen. I reported
the loss to my superior, together with my opinion that a theft
had indeed occurred. That night, I wrote out the details of
all of the incidents and our actions in response.
The unhappy news of the many missing items was reported to the university president. One ·of the first things
we were asked to do before the police were contacted was to
search all of our collections to be sure that we had not misfiled the ini.ssing materials elsewhere. A principal reason for
ordering such a massive search was the discovery that our insurance policy stated that the company was not obligated if
the only indication of a loss was an "inventory shortage."
Since we had no evidence of breaking and entering, the company
has steadfastly maintained the position of its policy, and the
question may have to be resolved in court. (I urge archivists
to read carefully the insurance policies that protect them in
cases of loss and be knowledgeable to what extent they are
covered.)
The order to make the extensive search of our entire
holdings was no blithe one issued by an administrator unaware
of what the command entailed for us. The university president's executive assistant spent some twenty-five years in
the position I now hold. Thus he knew exactly what was involved and how things could be misfiled.
As I look back on the accomplishments of the faculty
and staff in response to that administrative order, I am still
impressed. Each person was given a copy of the list of missing
materials, a list which ran to over four pages and which had
virtually to be memorized. All of the members of the departmental faculty, and most of the library assistants--nine
people in all--were relieved of other duties and assigned to
6
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searching teams. We left a small staff for the reading room.
All departmental leave, other than sick leave (none was taken),
was cancelled. The searchers opened and checked every Hollinger box, oversized box, records center box, package, and
other carton on more than two miles of shelving, as well as
every map tray, file drawer, and other storage container in
our charge.
This was in no sense an "inventory" as an insurance
company uses that word. There was no attempt to check systematically the contents item by item of each container against
a container or shelf list. We do have many such lists, but
we could not take the time to carry on a search of that depth.
Instead, we attempted to spot the file units--<laguerreotype
case and folders--which disappeared with the missing letters.
I felt certain, as I told the librarians, that we
would find none of the missing items during this search.
While we certainly do make mistakes and misfile items, our
control system is a good one and adhered to by the staff.
There were no flags in place of any of the missing items
as there should have been had the items been withdrawn
legitimately and subsequently misfiled. The massive search
confirmed the effectiveness of the control system. We
found very few materials out of place, and almost every
instance represented an error made years ago.
During the period that we were checking the manuscript collections, our colleagues in the Rare Book Department conducted a shelf-list reading of the books kept in the
vault. This search would have revealed eventually that two
books by university alumnus Edgar Allen Poe--TamerZane and
AZ Aaraaf, Tamer Zane and Minor Poems--were missing, but a
patron's request for them before the shelf readers reached
their filing location revealed this additional theft.
All employees of the two departments, twenty-two
persons, knew that we probably had been robbed. We asked
them to keep the news quiet while we carried on our searches,
and they responded beautifully. No word of the loss left
the two departments for the several months of searching
and other actions preceding the public announcement in early
December, 1973. Looking back on this period, I think one of
the best actions that we took was to keep the personnel of
the two departments as fully informed as possible. While
much stress and apprehension existed, openness helped to
alleviate these problems to some extent.
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The completion of our fruitless searches in the
Manuscripts Department, coupled with the discovery of the
loss from the Rare Book Department of the two extremely rare
Poe books, left the University no alternative but to accept
the fact that we had been robbed. The university police
thereupon were summoned to investigate the case. They were
highly critical of the fact that we had delayed so long in
bringing them into the case. Knowing something of police
work, I appreciate this attitude. But an inside job is
insidious. One is unsure that a theft has occurred, as there
always is the possibility of a filin~ error. Another possible explanation of the missing material is that a disgruntled staff member may have hidden them to cause trouble
and grief. And if there has been a theft, the likely suspects
are those persons with whom you work every day. That one of
them has stolen materials is an awful prospect to contemplate,
especially if you have hired many of them and worked with the
others for years, as I had.
By the nature of our work, the head of an archival
agency must have implicit faith in the integrity of the staff
of his agency. In no other way can the agency be run without
almost. insurmountable administrative problems. While I do
believe that candidates for archival positions must be investigated, particularly by speaking with former employers
and the persons listed as references, the truth of the matter
is that even a full field investigation by the F.B.I. would
not guarantee that someone might not later steal material.
The Daniel Ellsberg-Pentagon Papers case might be cited among
others; trusted employees, whose motives are said to be "higher" in such cases, presumably are the ones who keep columnists
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten on the pages of our daily newspapers.
The psychological effects of an apparent inside theft
are great. The personnel of our two departments inevitably
wondered about each other, and the resulting tensions hurt
morale. The request, early in the new year, that we all
submit to polygraph (lie detector) examination brought the
nadir of this tension. Persons who work in libraries and
archives rarely are acquainted with police methods and with
the polygraph. I was, as I have a brother who has been a
policeman. Still the request came ·as a shock.
I say "request" because it was exactly that. We
each had the theoretical right to refuse to take the test,
8
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but as you can imagine, the pressure to submit to it was
compelling . So many questions about the test came to me
and my colleague in charge of the Rare Book Department that
we ran out of answers and appealed to the university administration for help. The head of the university police, a
former F.B.I. agent, was sent to meet with both staffs. He
was only partially successful in alleviating fears, for a
few of the staff vented their frustrations on him with
antagonistic and skillful questioning.
Several persons consulted lawyers who advised their
clients not to take the test. One staff member, married to
a law student, spent hours in the law library reading everything she could find on the polygraph and the law. Ultimately,
I believe almost everyone submitted to the test, even some
who at first had refused. The pressure to do so was enormous.
It took many months for morale to recover. But when
no one was arrested, the staff began to relax. Moreover, as
rumors circled the two departments after visits from the police,
it became apparent that there was - at least one way in which
the inside job could have been committed by an outsider. Once
this was known, and since the police had not solved the crime,
things slowly returned to normal.
If it is true that librarians and archivists rarely
are acquainted with police and their procedures, the reverse
is equally so. We had to educate the police in our methods
and approaches before they really could conduct a thorough
investigation. And often thereafter as I conversed with
various officers, I realized they did not yet understand
rather basic archival procedures, and I would have to begin
again. After this experience, I suggest that archivists,
curators, and librarians attempt to educate their local
police by inviting them to tour the archival agency. Many
police departments have public relations programs and will
be glad to send officers to the agency as consultants on
security. Such consultations provide good opportunities
for the education of the police.
Since our theft, we have made several changes in
our security arrangements, some of which originated with the
police, some of which we thought of ourselves, and others of
which were joint efforts. Many of these are simple adjustments, not at all costly for the benefits they bring.
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Before the theft, all members of the faculty and sta
holding library assistant rank were allowed access to the
vault. Faculty members knew the combination since they occasionally needed to open the vault after field trips or
when working on Saturday. The police were highly critical
of this generous access policy, and we· were ordered by the
administration to limit severely the number of persons having
the vault combination and access. We reduced the number having
the combination to two in each department, and this has worked
well in practice. One of us always seems to be around to open
the vault in the morning. During the day, the inner doors,
which open with a key, remain locked, and only those persons
with access privileges may obtain the key and go in and out.
We regularly change the vault combination--which we now know
how to do ourselves--and always after one of the combination
holders leaves the faculty.
Originally we tried to confine access to the vault
to the same four persons who had the combination, but this
proved impractical. As the four persons who have the combination are the curators of the departments and their chief
deputies, I and my opposite number soon found that we were
spending considerable time as vault "go-fers." Eventually,
we persuaded the administration to adopt our present policy
of permitting vault privileges to all faculty members of the
two departments with at least three years service on our
staff.
A second criticism made by the police was that we
had no record of vault entry. We now maintain a book near
the vault door and log each visit: its purpose, times of
entrance and egress, and the name of the person making the
visit. I am afraid that none of us see the benefit of the
log since it is so easily falsified, but it makes the police
happy.
Another change has been refinement of the shelf list
of the manuscripts kept in the vault. To enable us to identify
these items as ours should any question arise, our cataloger
has prepared careful and complete descriptions of all the
bound manuscripts and slip cases. We pursued the check of
materials there, performing item-by-item inventories of large
collections such as the Faulkner and Jefferson papers. This
took months, but was worth the time for the peace of mind
resulting. We found nothing else unaccounted for.

10
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The general security of the areas of the library
building we occupy has been strengthened by reassessment of
the system of locks. In the two special collections departments, there are a total of fifty-one doors with locks. All
staff and student assistants have access to the key that works
the regular locks. They cannot move about the departments
without it. We have added to each of the critical entranceexit doors, as well as to certain others, an extra--a dead
bolt--lock. Not only have the dead bolt locks been obtained
from a different company than our regular locks, but the key
which works them is issued to but four faculty in each department and to the librarian and associate librarian. We would
prefer to constrict this number, but in case of an emergency,
such as a fire, we must be able to get into our areas quickly.
We also re-key this special set of locks routinely every six
months.
Our reading room has received a great deal of security
attention, for we realize that we are more likely to be "hit"
in it than in any other area of our operation. We are fortunate that the room has but one exterior door, by which all
visitors must enter and leave, because this makes for good
security. The door is located in the middle of one long wall
of the thirty-by-ninety-foot room. A large control desk,
some ten feet long, faced the patron upon entering the room.
Because a series of large structural columns run the length
of the room on the wall opposite the door, readers' tables
for years had been located in one long row along the wall
with the door. A reader at the far table could be forty
feet from the chief security person. Worse, when the clerk
was at one end of the room, ample opportunity existed for
a thief at the other end to slip a manuscript under a shirt
or skirt.
To combat this weakness in our layout, we rearranged
the room concentrating all the readers' tables in one end.
We moved the large control desk next to the entrance to the
room and turned it ninety degrees so that the person sitting
at it faces the readers. The size and length of this desk
either forces anyone entering the room to stop at it or channels them to a new control desk we have created with a tabledesk combination. We added a staff desk in the readers' end
of the reading room, but man it only when we are so busy that
the control desk attendant cannot see all the readers.
Staff
activities formerly conducted between the structural columns
are now concentrated in the end of the room opposite the
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readers, removing the noise of staff enterprise from the patrons.
Our next step was to control entrance and egress
from the area of readers' tables. Originally a length of
chain I picked up at Sears sufficed, but this has been replaced
with a theatre rope. Readers may enter or leave the research
area only with permission.
We have eliminated one possible way of removing manuscripts by requiring that ali brief cases, handbags, packages,
portfolios, and the like, as well as coats, be checked before
the patron enters the research area. We would ·prefer not to
operate a check service, but we did not have the funds to buy,
or the floor space to install, lockers with keys.
One suggestion of the police reinforced an idea of
our own. For some time we had wished to learn more about our
patrons and their projects. Our registration book of many
years had space only for name, permanent address, local address, and a word or two about the project. We drew up a
form which requires much more information about the patron
and which enables us to accumulate some useful statistical
information about the use of the collections. The police
suggested that in addition we request personal identification, such as a driver's license or a student identification
card, which we now do, recording the numbers from the cards
on the registration form. Our rules and regulations, which
the patron is asked to read and sign to indicate his willingness to comply, are printed on the recto.
Another novelty for us is requiring patrons leaving
the research area to submit all paper for inspection by the
staff. If someone absolutely insists on taking a briefcase
or a handbag to the table, we permit it only with the understanding that we will search the bag thoroughly before the
person leaves. (We have granted such a request in but one or
two instances.)
Our final innovation affecting readers is a limitation upon the amount of material they may have at a research
table. Formerly, we might bring out a book truck full of
material and park it beside the research table for the convenience of the patron. Now we limit to two the number of
(Hollinger) boxes at a table, and we no longer leave book
trucks in the readers' end of the room. Readers must turn
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in the two boxes to the desk attendant to obtain two more. I
still have reservations about allowing two boxes, for it is
possible to erect a barricade with them behind which a reader
may hide considerable activity. But reducing the limit would
mean too much "running and fetching" for the reading room
staff, and one must compromise at some point.
Possibly the only perfect system for a manuscripts
reading room would insist that each researcher strip to the
skin, wear into the room a sheet furnished by the institution,
use paper and pencil similarly provided to take his notes, use
one piece of manuscript at a time, each one of which would be
checked out and in individually, surrender all notes for inspection upon leaving the room, and submit to a body search
when returning the sheet in the dressing room. Any system
less than this will involve a certain amount of security risk
for archivists and curators if they are to fulfill the charge
of their profession to see that the materials in their charge
are as widely used as their institutional regulations will
permit.
Archivists should see that their superiors understand
these necessary risks. Then, should a theft occur, the report
of it will meet with more understanding. Our situation at the
University of Virginia was easier administratively because the
librarian has taken an active interest in manuscripts during
his professional career and has encouraged the growth of our
department during his tenure at the university. It has been of
benefit to us also that one of the university president's major
advisers is a former curator of manuscripts, and that the president himself is a Tennyson scholar who makes use of our facilities
in his own work. Invite your superiors into your areas at every
opportunity. Have coffee with them, lunch with them, and lobby
them unmercifully. Send them copies of articles on manuscripts,
rare books, and the special problems of both. But be sure they
develop an appreciation of the concerns peculiar to the administration and security of archives and manuscripts.
Attention has to be devoted, too, to special training
for personnel who staff reading room desks. These persons
must be the chief defense against theft, and they need instruction in procedures to follow should they observe, or suspect,
a concealment of materials leading to a theft.
Virginia State Archivist William Van Schreeven, who
trained me, was one of those large men who have the knack of
13
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University,
1976

11

Georgia Archive, Vol. 4 [1976], No. 1, Art. 2

moving quietly. On many occasions I have heard a question
issuing from the empty air behind my right ear and jumped to
find Van Schreeven standing there, a smile upon his face. He
was particularly fond of pulling this stunt on those of us
who manned the main desk in the reading room . While he expected us to take work to the desk, he insisted we learn to
work with one eye on the readers in the room. His "sneak
attacks" were one way of reminding us of our primary responsibilities of service and security.
I think we must do more to train our public service
personnel to develop this technique of double vision. It is
almost a cliche of manuscript work that our staffs are far
too small to accomplish all that needs to be done. We expect
our employees to write letters and perform other functions
while working in our reading rooms . We must, I believe, less- ,
en these administrative demands. When weighed against the
security responsibilities of these persons, the routine work
should be secondary. Of course, the employees need to have
enough work to accomplish so that they do not fall asleep
like the guards in some reading rooms I have visited.
For many years a clerical employee, backed by a
faculty member, manned our main control desk in the reading
room. This arrangement was adequate in a time when reader
use was not particularly heavy and reader's questions uncomplicated. The clerk could handle our accessioning as
well as the public service. But our reader use, climbing
steadily, has increased seventy percent during the past
four years. Combining the greater demands for service with
the need for improved security, we found it desirable to
rearrange job descriptions so that a library assistant is
stationed at the main desk and assigned public service duties
only. The person has the support of the public services archivist in the room, as well as the stack supervisor. Also
available in the staff end of the room are another faculty
member and clerk, though their desks do not permit them to
observe the readers. The library assistant is our main
security person in the reading room, and for this reason,
late last fall I asked the university's legal adviser to
visit the room to review the security and to give us advice
about the legal problems involved with accusing someone of
removing material from the room.
The attorney looked over the situation and immediately
suggested that we post large and prominent signs forbidding
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https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/georgia_archive/vol4/iss1/2

12

Berkeley: Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View

the removal of library material from the room. Such a statement appears in our rules and regulations, but it is one of
many paragraphs on a legal-sized sheet with lots of small
type. The attorney felt someone could maintain that he did
not read "all that stuff." We now have two large signs. One
hangs prominently over the control desk facing the readers at
their tables; the other is displayed on the inside of the doors
through which one must pass to leave the room.
Several days after this visit, the attorney sent us
a sheet of suggestions and procedures for dealing with a person that we might see, or suspect of, concealing something.
Conduct yourself with utmost courtesy and deference to the individual's right of privacy and
free movement. • • • If one strongly suspects an
item has been slipped inside the clothing, the individual should be delayed until the University Department of Police has been called. Do not push,
touch, or otherwise physically interfere with the
suspect. If you see the item or actually saw him
. conceal it, you should attempt to delay him by blocking his path as discreetly as possible. PoZiteZy ask
him to wait a moment until a police officer arrives.
If the individual becomes obstreperous or violent,
you may not fight with him or physically stop him
without being in danger of infringing upon his rights
or getting hurt yourself. You may only actually arrest him if you have a reasonable suspicion that a
felony has been committed in your presence. You
should exercise this common law right and duty to
arrest only in the most compelling of circumstances.
Note the name and address of the suspect and the time
of the incident. If you confront or detain a library
user, have a witness (another employee) there with
you.
At my request, the attorney also had one of his assistants review the Code of Virginia to see what laws were applicable in case we detained someone who was proven innocent
after a search. I had nightmares of one of us being sued for
false arrest, and feared a staff member would be reluctant to
confront someone suspected of theft if the staff member knew
he was personally liable in a case of false arrest.
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The check of the Code revealed that there were no
applicable laws in the Conunonwealth which offered to librarians and archivists the protection granted to merchants detaining someone suspected of shoplifting. The university
attorney innnediately drafted legislation to cover this situation, and sent it to us for our review. I went over the
proposed legislation with my faculty, and we submitted a
number of changes to the attorney, chiefly to the definition
of library materials. The old definition in the Code was
useless, as it did not mention many types of materials conunonly held in libraries today. The bill was polished up and returned to me with the suggestion that I ask a delegate to
introduce it. The University had a number of other bills in
which it was interested and did not wish to spread its influence too far.
With some trepidation, I sent the bill and a letter
of explanation to our local representative. He was most
cooperative. We got the bill into the hopper just ahead of
the deadline for submission to the 1975 annual session of
the General Assembly, and were fortunate to have it pass
both houses and be signed by the governor. The bill makes
concealment of library property a crime. As "proof of the
willful concealment • • • shall be prima facie evidence of
intent to conunit larceny thereof." More important from our
point of view is the section entitled "Exemption from liability for arrest of suspected person."
A library or agent or employee of the library
causing the arrest of any person pursuant to the
provisions of §.42 .1-73 [the section on concealment]
shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery
of the person so arrested • • • provided that, in
causing the arrest of such person, the library or
agent or employee of the Library had at the time
of such arrest probable cause to believe that the
person conunitted willful concealment of books or
other library property. [The full text of the bill
appears on pages 18 and 19.)
We feel that we are rather well protected in dealing
with a reader concealing something ·prior to leaving with it.
The bill does not make a confrontation situation easier, but
it does give the staff some confidence that in such a situation they have support for their actions, provided they
proceed carefully.

16
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The topic of publicity of a theft from an institution is an important and difficult one. Although our staff
for several months had concealed the news of the theft and
the searches being conducted, it seemed inevitable that word
would get out and reach the press. We believed we should
be in a far stronger position to control the story if we
released it ourselves, and released it rather than waiting
to be confronted. In most respects, I think we were right,
Virginians were stunned to realize we had manuscripts and
rare books so valuable that someone would wish to steal
$125,000 worth. By and large, press reaction was sympathetic. There were a few critical reports aimed at our apparent
lack of security, which we fueled by letting slip through in
our press release one statement that was easily misinterpreted.
For many years, libraries and archives have not wished
to publicize thefts because it was felt that knowledge of a
theft would cause potential donors to withhold their gifts
In some instances, institutions have been unwilling to prosecute thieves because the publicity of a trial would have
revealed the theft. This attitude has eased the work of
thieves. Without public announcement of missing ~aterials,
dealers sometimes purchased stolen materials unwittingly.
A dishonest collector was willing to purchase materials
that he might have shied from were it well known they had
been stolen from an institution.
At this time, I do not know of a single collection
that we have failed to acquire because the potential donor
felt our security was not good enough. Of course, there may
be some who have not told us. Other donors did ask about the
theft in the months after our announcement, but their questions were sympathetic ones resulting from curiosity. I
am convinced that the publicity of the theft did have positive benefits for our collecting program. We gained public
consciousness of our repository as no report of an accession
ever had, or probably ever will.
The worst risk run by publicizing a theft, in my
opinion, is that the thief may feel the publicity has destroyed his market for the stolen property, leaving him no
alternative but destruction of the material. This was a
major concern of the University of Virginia in making the
decision to publicize our theft as widely as possible.
Since we have not to this date recovered any of our stolen
material, it is possible that the thief or thieves did
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destroy it. We may never know. But we felt that the benefits
of publicity outweighed the risk.
Breaking with the old tradition of concealment of a
theft was an important step. More honesty about theft from
archives and libraries is needed. The country is in the
midst of a major crime wave involving archives and libraries,
but only archivists and librarians seem to be aware of it.
Publicity will help, for the more responsible people who are
aware of our security problem, the more assistance we shall
receive in dealing with it. One excellent sign of support is
the $90,000 grant to the Society of American Archivists from
the National Endowment for the Humanities to fund a number of
proposals for specific programs on archival security.
My involvement with archival security has not been
a pleasant one. It has been instructive but not in ways
that I should have preferred to mark my career. I am glad
to be involved in archival security from a more objective
and useful perspective, and I hope and expect that the next
paper that I write on this subject will not have to carry
the qualifying phrase of this one in its title.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That § §42.1-72 and 42.1-73 of the Code of
Virginia are amended and reenacted and the Code
of Virginia is amended by adding sections numbered
42.1-73.1and42.1-74.1 as follows:
§ 42.1-72. Injuring or destroying books and other
property of libraries. -Any person who willfully,
maliciously or wantonly writes upon, injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book
or other library property belonging to or in the
custody of any public, county or regional library,
the State Library, other repository of pub Iic records,
museums or any library or collection belonging to
or in the custody of any educational, eleemosynary,
benevolent, hereditary, historical library or patriotic institution, organization or society, shall be
guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.
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§ 42.1 -73. Concealment of book or other property while on premises of library ; removal of book
or other property from library. -Whoever, without
authority, with the intention of converting to his
own or another's use, willfully conceals a book or
other library property, while still on the premises
of such library, or willfully or without authority
removes any book or other property from any of
the above libraries or co llections shall be deemed
guilty of larceny thereof, and upon conv iction
thereof shall be pun ished as provided by law. Proof
of the willful concealment of such book or other
library property while still on the premises of such
library shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
commit larceny thereof.
§ 42.1-73.1 Exemption from liability for arrest
of suspected person . -A library or agent or employee of the library causing the arrest of any
person pursuant to the provisions of §42.1 -73,
shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery of the
person so arrested, whether such arrest takes place
on the premises of the library or after close pursuit
from such premises by such agent or employee;
provided that, in causing ~he arrest of such person,
the library or agent or employee of the iibrary had
at the time of such arrest probable cause to believe
- ~ that the person committed -willful concealment of
books or other library property.
§ 42.1 -7 4.1 "Book or other Iibrary property"
defined. The terms " book or other library property"
as used in this chapter shall include any book,
plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting,
drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet,
broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public
record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual
materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes,
electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other
documentary, written ~ or printed material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging
to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of any
library, museum, repository of public or other
records institution as specified in § 42.1 -72.
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